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This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technolo-
gies and the decentralization of ﬁrms. Centralized control relies on the information
of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentral-
ized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior
information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make
choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public
information about the speciﬁc technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor
of centralization. We show that ﬁrms closer to the technological frontier, ﬁrms in
more heterogeneous environments, and younger ﬁrms are more likely to choose
decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British ﬁrms in the 1990s,
we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the deter-
minants of ﬁrms’ organizational choices. This interest is partly
motivated by the belief that new technologies are inducing ﬁrms
to become less hierarchical and more decentralized. Despite this
interest, there is limited work on the determinants of the decen-
tralization decisions of ﬁrms. This paper undertakes a theoreti-
cal and empirical investigation of how the allocation of authority
within ﬁrms changes as the information structure in an industry
evolves.
We develop a simple model where ﬁrms make choices on how
to implement new technologies. Different organizational forms
are distinguished by the amount of information they use in these
decisions. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997), centralized control re-
lies more on the information of the principal, which we equate
with publicly available information about past implementations
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of similartechnologies.1 Decentralized control delegates authority
to a manager, who potentially possesses more information than is
available in the public history. Nevertheless, because the inter-
ests of the principal and the manager are not perfectly aligned,
the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices
that are not in the best interest of the principal. This tradeoff be-
tweenthesuperiorknowledgeofthemanagerandtheagencycosts
of managerial delegation determines the optimal degree of decen-
tralization. The main focus of our analysis is on how learning from
the experiences of other ﬁrms changes this tradeoff. Typically, the
more a principal learns from other ﬁrms regarding the implemen-
tation of new technologies, the less she needs to delegate control
to the manager.
Using this basic framework, we derive three sets of empirical
predictions:
1. Firms closer to the technological frontier are more likely to
choosedecentralization,becausetheyaredealingwithnew
technologies about which there is only limited information
in the public history.
2. Firms in more heterogeneous environments are more
likely to be decentralized, because greater heterogene-
ity makes learning from the experiences of others more
difﬁcult.
3. Young ﬁrms, which have had a limited history in which to
learn about their own speciﬁc needs, are also more likely
to be decentralized than older ﬁrms.
The bulk of the paper investigates these predictions using
two large data sets of French ﬁrms and establishments and one
smaller set of British establishments in the 1990s. We document
a range of empirical patterns consistent with these predictions:
ﬁrmsclosertothetechnological frontieroftheirindustry,ﬁrmsop-
erating in more heterogeneous environments, and younger ﬁrms
are more likely to choose decentralization.
In addition, since our theoretical approach emphasizes the
importance of learning about the implementation of new technolo-
gies, we also look separately at high-tech industries (deﬁned as
those using information technology intensively). Consistent with
our theoretical approach, we ﬁnd that the relationship between
1. Throughout the paper the principal could be thought of as either the owner
or the chief operating ofﬁcer of the ﬁrm.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1761
heterogeneity or distance to frontier and decentralization is sig-
niﬁcantly stronger in high-tech than in low-tech industries.
Our main measure of decentralization is whether different
units of the ﬁrm are organized into “proﬁt centers.” We show that
our main results are robust to proxying decentralization by the
extent of delayering or measures of managerial autonomy over
investment and/or employment decisions. The results are also
robust to the inclusion of a range of controls, to using various
different measures of heterogeneity, and to different estimation
strategies.
Onthetheoreticalside,ourpaperismostcloselyrelatedtothe
literature on the costs and beneﬁts of delegation or decentraliza-
tion in ﬁrms. A ﬁrst strand of this literature, for example, Baron
and Besanko (1992) and Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein
(1995), investigates the conditions for delegated contracting to
replicate the constrained efﬁcient centralized contracting. As em-
phasized by Mookherjee (2006), however, the presence of complete
contracts in these models implies that delegation can at best repli-
cate the constrained efﬁcient allocation that is also achievable by
centralized contracting. A second strand emphasizes information
processing and communication costs as determinants of central-
ization or decentralization in ﬁrms.2 Although we also stress the
importance of learning, our focus is different, namely on how pub-
lic information affects how much autonomy the principal would
liketogranttotheagent.Closertoourpaperaretherecentmodels
emphasizing the trade-off between loss of control and better infor-
mation under decentralization—in particular, Aghion and Tirole
(1997), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999), Rajan and Zingales
(2001), Dessein (2002), and Hart and Moore (2005).3 The main
differences between these papers and ours are twofold: ﬁrst, be-
cause there are no incentive effects of the form of the organization,
our framework is signiﬁcantly simpler and allows us to focus on
the basic tradeoff between information and loss of control; second,
2. See, among others, Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Geanakoplos and Milgrom
(1991), Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont
(1994), and Garicano (2000).
3. The possibility that the implementation of new technologies could encour-
age delegation was ﬁrst raised by Jensen and Meckling (1992). Aghion and Tirole
(1997) emphasize the tradeoff between loss of control and the agent’s ex ante incen-
tives to acquire information under decentralization. Hart and Moore (2005) show
how the tradeoff between loss of control and information can explain why in many
hierarchies generalists command specialists. Dessein (2002) develops a model in
which decentralization to a specialized agent entails a loss of control for the prin-
cipal but at the same time reduces the agent’s incentive to miscommunicate her
information to the principal.1762 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
we allow the principal to learn from other ﬁrms’ or from her own
ﬁrm’s past experience, which is the source of all the comparative
static results we investigate in the empirical work. 4
The main contribution of our paper is the empirical evidence
we provide on the determinants of decentralization. Previous
work in the literature focuses on the general move toward
“ﬂatter” organizations.5 Rajan and Wulf (2006) provide the most
systematic statistical description of recent organizational trends,
showing a strong movement toward ﬂatter corporations in the
United States between 1986 and 1999. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) report a
positive association between various measures of decentraliza-
tion and organizational change on the one hand and information
technology (and human capital) on the other. Baker and Hubbard
(2003, 2004) document the effect of new technologies (on-board
computers) on ownership patterns in the U.S. trucking industry.
Other related papers include Colombo and Delmastro (2004),
who present empirical models of decentralization in Italian
manufacturing plants; Lerner and Merges (1998), who examine
the allocation of control rights in biotechnology alliances; and
the papers by Ichinowski, Prenushi, and Shaw (1997), Black and
Lynch (2001), and Janod and Saint-Martin (2004), which examine
the impact of human resource practices and ﬁrm reorganization
on productivity. None of these papers investigate the relationship
between decentralization (or organizational change) and distance
to frontier or heterogeneity.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents some preliminary data description to motivate
the basic theoretical framework, which is developed in Section III.
Section IV describes the data and our main econometric speciﬁ-
cation. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI con-
cludes. Appendix A, which contains a more detailed exposition of
4. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) present a different model, where endogenous
accumulation of information affects the internal organization of ﬁrms. In their
model,alargernumberofﬁrmsintheeconomyenablesbetterrelativeperformance
of evaluation and creates a shift from direct to indirect monitoring. The number
of ﬁrms in the economy is, in turn, determined endogenously as a function of the
stage of development and the level of the capital stock. The relationship between
distance to the frontier and various aspects of the internal organization of the ﬁrm
is also investigated in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003, 2006).
5. This phenomenon is described by different terms in different contexts, in-
cluding decentralization, delayering, and delegation. In the theory, consistent with
the principal-agent literature, we use the term “delegation,” while in the empirical
analysis, we adopt the terms used in the data sets (e.g., “decentralization” in the
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the theory and the proofs from Section III, and Appendix B, which
contains additional data description and robustness checks, are
available upon request and on the Web.6
II. BASIC PATTERNS
To motivate our focus in the paper, we ﬁrst present some
salient patterns from a database of several thousand French man-
ufacturing ﬁrms, the “Changements Organisationnels et Informa-
tisation” (COI). This data set, as well as our two other data sets, is
described below. Our key indicator for decentralization from the
COI is whether a ﬁrm is organized into proﬁt centers or whether
it is more centrally controlled, with divisions organized as cost
centers (or in some other more centralized manner). A manager
of a proﬁt center is concerned with all aspects of the business
that contribute to proﬁtability, while managers in charge of cost
centers focus only on cost targets. When a ﬁrm organizes its divi-
sions into proﬁt centers, it typically delegates substantially more
authority to its managers (see the discussion in Section IV).
Figures I–III show the proportion of the 3,570 ﬁrms in our
baseline COI sample that are decentralized into proﬁt centers bro-
ken down by various ﬁrm characteristics. Figure I divides ﬁrms
into deciles depending on the heterogeneity of the ﬁrm’s environ-
ment. Heterogeneity is measured as the difference between log
productivity (value added per hour) growth at the 90th and the
10th percentiles of the relevant four-digit industry. This variable
is a natural measure of technological heterogeneity among ﬁrms
within a four-digit industry; it will be greater in industries where
someﬁrmsareexperiencingmuchfasterproductivitygrowththan
others. The construction of this variable is discussed in greater
detail in Section IV.
Figure I shows a general increase in the probability of de-
centralization as we move from the ﬁrms in the least heteroge-
neous industries to those in the most heterogeneous industries;
while 24% of the ﬁrms are decentralized in the second decile, this
number is 41% in the tenth decile. The ﬁrst decile is somewhat
anomalous, but closer investigation shows that there is a dispro-
portionately large number of less productive and older ﬁrms in
these sectors, aspects that we now turn to.
Figure II plots the fraction of ﬁrms decentralized into proﬁt
centers against the proximity to the frontier (measured as the
6. http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/index.htm?prof id=acemoglu&type=paper.1764 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE I
Heterogeneity and Decentralization
Notes.T h eX-axis divides all ﬁrms into deciles of heterogeneity from the ﬁrst
decile (low heterogeneity) to the tenth decile (high heterogeneity). Heterogeneity
is measured by an index of dispersion (the difference of the 90th minus the 10th
percentile) of productivity growth between ﬁrms in a four-digit industry (see text).
The Y-axis indicates the proportion of ﬁrms that are decentralized into proﬁt
centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
ﬁrms in 1997).
ratio of the ﬁrm’s value added per hour to the value added per
hour of the ﬁrm at the 99th percentile of the distribution in the
same four-digit industry). While 27% of the ﬁrms in the bottom
quintile of the proximity distribution are decentralized, 38% of
the ﬁrms in the top quintile, which are closer to the technology
frontier, are decentralized.
Finally, Figure III shows that younger ﬁrms are, on average,
more decentralized than older ﬁrms: about 45% of the ﬁrms under
the age of ﬁve years are decentralized, compared to 30% for the
older ﬁrms.
In the rest of the paper, we document that the patterns shown
in Figures I–III are robust to a variety of controls, different es-
timation techniques, and different empirical measures approxi-
mating our theoretical concepts. For example, we show that theTECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1765
FIGURE II
Proximity to Frontier and Decentralization
Notes.T h eX-axis divides all ﬁrms into deciles of proximity to frontier (in terms
of value added per hour) from the ﬁrst decile (low proximity to frontier) to the tenth
decile (highproximity to frontier).The Y-axisindicates the proportion ofﬁrms that
are decentralized into proﬁt centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is
the COI sample (3,570 French ﬁrms in 1997).
same broad patterns apply when we use the variation in produc-
tivity levels within four-digit industries (rather than productivity
growth) and also a ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of heterogeneity, measur-
ing the “distance” between the product mix of a ﬁrm and those
of other ﬁrms in the population of French ﬁrms. We also show
that our main results are robust to using alternative measures of
decentralization, including measures of delayering and manage-
rial autonomy over investment and/or employment decisions (the
age results are somewhat weaker with some of these alternative
measures of decentralization).
Overall, the patterns in Figures I–III, and our more de-
tailed results below, suggest that ﬁrms that operate in more
heterogeneous environments, that are closer to the technologi-
cal frontier, and that are younger are more likely to be decen-
tralized. These correlations, especially the relationship between1766 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE III
Firm Age and Decentralization
Notes. Firms are grouped into age bands (dated from the birth of the ﬁrm). The
Y-axis indicates the proportion of ﬁrms that are decentralized into proﬁt centers
in the relevant age group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French ﬁrms in
1997).
decentralization and heterogeneity, indicate that information ac-
quisition and learning may the important factors in the decentral-
ization decisions of ﬁrms. In particular, ﬁrms in more heteroge-
neous environments, those closer to the technology frontier, and
younger ﬁrms naturally face greater uncertainty regarding their
business decisions in general and the optimal implementation of
new technologies in particular, compared to ﬁrms that are in more
homogeneous environments, farther from the frontier, and more
experienced. This motivates our theoretical approach emphasiz-
ing the relationship between learning and decentralization, which
is presented in the next section. Although there may be alterna-
tive explanations for some of our ﬁndings, we are not aware of
other approaches that can explain the evidence as satisfactorily
as our theoretical framework.
III. THEORY
In this section, we describe a theoretical environment linking
information and technology choices to decentralization decisions.
Our purpose is to highlight a number of implications that willTECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1767
be investigated in the empirical work below. More details on the
theoretical framework, as well as the proofs of all the results
statedhere, are contained intheworking paper version, Acemoglu
et al. (2006), as well as in Appendix A.
Suppose that there is a ladder of technologies, k = 1,2,....
At each point in time, t = 1,2,..., each ﬁrm i has previously im-
plemented up to some technology, say k− 1. The next technology
in the ladder, k, becomes available to this ﬁrm with probability
pi ∈ (0,1]. The parameter pi thus measures the speed at which
ﬁrm i climbs the technology ladder. The realizations of techno-
logical opportunities are independent across ﬁrms and over time.
When a new technology becomes available to a ﬁrm, it decides
how to implement it. In particular, the ﬁrm chooses between two
actions, Land R,thatcorrespondtotwodifferentchoicesintheim-
plementation of the new technology. Dropping the time index, the
choice of the ﬁrm is denoted by xi,k ∈{ L, R}. One of these choices,
x∗
i,k ∈{ L, R}, leads to successful implementation, while the other
leadstoanunsuccessfuloutcome. Wewillreferto x∗
i,k asthecorrect
action. Successful implementation of a technology increases the
ﬁrm’s productivity by a factor γ>1, while unsuccessful imple-
mentation leaves the productivity of the ﬁrm unchanged.
We assume that the successful action for ﬁrm i in the imple-
mentation of technology k is given by
(1) x∗
i,k =

x∗
k with probability 1 − ε
∼ x∗
k with probability ε,
where x∗
k ∈{ L, R} is the reference action for technology k, ∼x∗
k
denotes “not x∗
k”( i . e . ,i fx∗
k = L,t h e n∼x∗
k = R), and 0 <ε<1/2.
Conditional on x∗
k, the realizations of x∗
i,k and x∗
i ,k for any i  = i 
are independent.7 We assume that, for each technology, the prior
probability that L (or R) is the reference action is equal to 1/2.
This speciﬁcation implies that there is a generally correct
(“conventional”) way of implementing each technology, given by
the reference action, but differences in ﬁrms’ speciﬁc needs and
competencies imply that some ﬁrms need to take a different ac-
tion for successful implementation. Equation (1) thus makes it
clear that ε is a measure of heterogeneity among ﬁrms: when ε
is equal to zero, the reference action is the correct action for all
7. This implies that when x∗
k = L, {x∗
i,k}i is a Bernoulli sequence with param-
eter 1 − ε,a n dw h e nx∗
k = R, it is a Bernoulli sequence with parameter ε.1768 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ﬁrms; when ε is equal to 1/2, the correct action is unrelated across
ﬁrms.
Each ﬁrm is owned by a principal who maximizes its value
conditional on the public information available. Successful imple-
mentation and hence proﬁts depend on the organization of the
ﬁrm. The two alternative organizational forms available to each
ﬁrm are centralization and delegation. With centralization (de-
noted by di,k = 0), the principal manages the ﬁrm and chooses
xi,k; with delegation (di,k = 1), the choice of xi,k is delegated to a
manager.
The principal in ﬁrm i has no special skills in identifying the
right action. Therefore, under centralization she bases her deci-
sion on the history of publicly available information relevant for
technology k at the time of her decision, denoted by hi
k. In con-
trast, the manager of ﬁrm i observes the correct action x∗
i,k,s ot h a t
he knows exactly which action will lead to successful implemen-
tation. However, his interests may not be aligned with those of
the owner. Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), we model this in
a reduced-form way and assume that the preferred action of the
manager for technology k is given by
(2) z∗
i,k =

x∗
i,k with probability δ
∼ x∗
i,k with probability 1 − δ.
This speciﬁcation implies that δ i sam e a s u r eo fcongruence be-
tween the ﬁrm’s and the manager’s objectives. Notice that equa-
tion (2) implies that the manager is informed about the right
action for this particular ﬁrm (not only about the right reference
action).
We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions to focus on
the main implications of this framework. First, we assume that
therelationshipbetweentheﬁrmandeachmanagerisshort-term.
Second, when xi,k = z∗
i,k, the manager obtains a private beneﬁt. We
assume that managers are credit-constrained and cannot compen-
sate principals for these private beneﬁts and that these private
beneﬁts are sufﬁciently large so that it is not proﬁtable for the
principal to utilize incentive contracts to induce managers to take
the right action. These assumptions imply that delegation will
lead to the implementation of the action that is preferred by the
manager; thus, when there is delegation, xi,k = z∗
i,k.8
8. Put differently, in this model the choice between centralization and delega-
tion simply corresponds to whether or not the “ advice” of the manager is followedTECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1769
Finally, we assume that δ ∈ (1/2,1 − ε), which implies that
the manager’s interests are more likely to be aligned with those
of the principal than otherwise (δ>1/2) and that the conﬂict of
interest between the principal and the manager is sufﬁciently
severe so that a principal who knows the reference action is more
likely to make the correct choice if she, rather than the manager,
decides (δ<1 − ε).
The organizational form and implementation decisions by the
principal of ﬁrm i for technology k depend on the history of pub-
lic information hi
k, which includes the outcomes of all previous
attempts with technology k(in particular, which actions were cho-
sen and whether they led to successful implementation). Since
conditional on x∗
k the success or failure of different ﬁrms in the
past are independent, all payoff-relevant information can be sum-
marized by hi
k ={ ni
k, ˜ ni
k}. Here, ni
k is the number of ﬁrms that have
attempted to implement this technology before ﬁrm i,a n d˜ ni
k ≤ ni
k
is the number of ﬁrms for which L turned out to be the proﬁtable
action.9 Note also that ni
k is a direct measure of distance to the
technology frontier.I fni
k is high, it means that many other ﬁrms
have implemented technology k before ﬁrm i. Therefore, compar-
ative statics with respect to ni
k will be informative about the im-
pact of the distance to the technology frontier on decentralization
decisions.
Let π(di,k;hi
k) denote the probability that ﬁrm i chooses the
correct action conditional on history hi
k and the organizational
form di,k. It can be shown that proﬁt maximization in this con-
text is equivalent to maximizing π(di,k;hi
k) in every period (see
Acemoglu et al. [2006]). Hence, the principal will choose di,k = 1
(delegation) if π(di,k = 1;hi
k) >π(di,k = 0;hi
k).
The above discussion establishes that when the principal
chooses delegation, we have π(1;hi
k) = δ. On the other hand,
under centralization, that is, di,k = 1, the principal makes the
by the principal. In particular, all the results would be identical if we considered
a somewhat different model in which the manager reported his recommendation
and then the principal decided which action to take. In this alternative model,
“delegation” would correspond to the principal following the recommendation of
the manager. See Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Appendix A for the results in the case
where the principal can use incentive contracts.
9. Note that ˜ ni
k is equal to the number of ﬁrms that have adopted technology
k before i, chose xi ,k = L, and were successful, plus the number of ﬁrms that
chose xi ,k = R and were unsuccessful. The public information set also includes
the organizational forms chosen by ﬁrms that have previously adopted technology
k,butequation(2)impliesthat ˜ ni
k isasufﬁcientstatisticforthispublicinformation.1770 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
optimal implementation decision given the publicly available in-
formation. Consequently, the probability of success when the prin-
cipal chooses centralization, π(0;hi
k), is a stochastic variable that
depends on history hi
k ={ ni
k, ˜ ni
k}. That is, it depends both on the
ﬁrm’s distance to the frontier, ni
k, and on the experiences of ﬁrms
that have previously implemented the technology, ˜ ni
k. As the dis-
tance to the frontier, ni
k, increases, the history available to the
principal expands and she learns the reference action, x∗
k,w i t h
greater precision. More speciﬁcally, when ﬁrm i is at the tech-
nology frontier, so that ni
k = 0, the principal has no useful infor-
mation and π(0;hi
k) = 1/2. In contrast, as the principal observes
the experiences of sufﬁciently many other ﬁrms, the probability
that she chooses the correct action under centralization increases.
In particular, it can be shown that plimni
k−→∞π(0;hi
k) = 1 − ε.10
This implies that when ni
k is small, π(0;hi
k) will be less than
π(1;hi
k) = δ>1/2, but as ni
k increases, it will approach 1 − ε and
thus exceed π(1;hi
k) = δ (since δ<1 − ε). This argument estab-
lishes that delegation will be chosen by ﬁrms closer to the technol-
ogyfrontier,butnotbythosethataresufﬁcientlybehind.Denoting
the optimal organizational choice given history hi
k by d∗
i,k(hi
k), we
can therefore establish the following result.
PROPOSITION 1 (Distance to Frontier). Consider the adoption deci-
sionoftechnologykbyﬁrmi,andsupposethatδ ∈ (1/2,1 − ε).
Then
(i) For a ﬁrm at the technology frontier, that is, ni
k = 0, the
principal chooses delegation. That is, d∗
i,k(hi
k ={ 0,0}) = 1.
(ii) For a ﬁrm sufﬁciently far from the technology frontier, that
is, as ni
k →∞, the principal (almost surely) chooses cen-
tralization. That is, plimni
k−→∞d∗
i,k(hi
k ={ ni
k, ˜ ni
k}) = 0.
In the empirical analysis, we proxy distance to the technol-
ogy frontier with the gap between the productivity of a particular
ﬁrm and the highest productivity (or the highest percentile pro-
ductivity) in the same industry. Firms that are further behind the
frontier(i.e.,thosewithhigherni
k’s)willbelessproductivebecause
10. The statements here and in Proposition 1 show that as ni
k →∞ , π(0;hi
k)
will increase toward 1 − ε. One might also conjecture that π(0;hi
k) and hence the
probability of centralization should be monotonically increasing in ni
k.I nA c e m o g l u
et al. (2006), we showed that when ni
k is low, integer issues may cause π(0;hi
k)t o
be nonmonotonic, but it is increasing in ni
k “on average,” that is, when we average
over neighboring values of ni
k to smooth out integer issues.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1771
they have been unlucky in the past and have had fewer opportuni-
ties to adopt technologies, and also because these are typically the
ﬁrms with lower pi’s, which are slower in climbing the technology
ladder. Using this proxy, we test the prediction that centralization
increases with the distance to the frontier.11
Our next result links the parameter of heterogeneity, ε,t o
ﬁrms’ decentralization decisions. Let Pr(d∗
i,k(hi
k) = 1) be the un-
conditional probability that ﬁrm i will choose delegation when
implementing technology k.
PROPOSITION 2 (Heterogeneity). Consider the adoption decision of
technology k by ﬁrm i. Given the distance to frontier ni
k,a n
increase in heterogeneity, ε, makes delegation more likely.
That is, ∂ Pr(d∗
i,k(hi
k) = 1)/∂ε ≥ 0 for all hi
k.
Intuitively, when ε is small, there is less heterogeneity in
the environment, and the performance of ﬁrms that have imple-
mented the same technology in the past reveals more information
about the reference action. Consequently, when ε is small, ﬁrms’
posterior beliefs are more responsive to public information. In
other words, given a history hi
k, ∂π(0;hi
k)/∂ε ≤ 0, so that as ε in-
creases, delegation becomes more attractive at each history hi
k.12
The complication in the proof comes from the fact that a change in
ε also affects the likelihood of different histories. Nevertheless, it
can be proved that a greater ε changes the ex ante distribution of
different histories inadirection that alsoincreases the probability
of delegation.
Proposition 2 provides the most interesting testable implica-
tion of our approach; it suggests that there should be more decen-
tralization in industries with greater dispersion of performance
across ﬁrms and also that decentralization should be more likely
for ﬁrms that are more dissimilar to others. In the empirical sec-
tion,weproxyheterogeneityusingthreedifferentmeasures.First,
we use the dispersion of productivity growth within a four-digit
industry. This is a natural measure, since a higher ε corresponds
to greater variability in the successful implementation of a given
technology and thus to greater variability in productivity growth.
11. Although in this section we state the results in terms of “distance to the
technology frontier,” in the empirical work it will be more convenient to use the
inverse of this, “proximity to the frontier.”
12. Interestingly, this applies to both “correct” and “incorrect” beliefs. For
instance, suppose that x∗
k = L,b u tR has been successful more than half of the
time; when ε is small, the ﬁrm will assign higher probability to Rbeing the correct
action.1772 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Second, we check these results using the dispersion in levels of
productivity within an industry. Finally, we use a ﬁrm-level proxy
for heterogeneity, the (IT-weighted) distance between the product
mix of a particular ﬁrm and those of other ﬁrms in the same in-
dustry, the idea being that ﬁrms with a product mix that is more
similar to others should be able to learn more from past experi-
ences of other ﬁrms.
In Acemoglu et al. (2006), we extended this framework to
derive a relationship between ﬁrm age and organizational struc-
ture. Firms learn not only from other ﬁrms, but also from their
own past experiences. The implication of this extension is that
younger ﬁrms that have accumulated less “ﬁrm-speciﬁc” infor-
mation are more likely to choose delegation. Motivated by this
observation, in our empirical analysis we also investigate the re-
lationship between ﬁrm age and delegation.
IV. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATA
IV.A. Empirical Strategy
Inourempiricalanalysis,wewilldocumentanumberofcorre-
lations motivated by the theory presented in the previous section.
Recall that the main predictions of our approach are as follows:
1. Delegation should be more common for ﬁrms closer to the
technological frontier.
2. Delegationshouldbemoreprevalent inenvironments with
greater heterogeneity.
3. Young ﬁrms should be more likely to choose delegation.
We investigate these predictions by studying the relationship
between various explanatory factors and decentralization deci-
sions of several thousand French and British ﬁrms. Consider the
following econometric model for delegation,
(3) d∗
ilt = αHilt−1 + βPF ilt−1 + γageilt−1 + w 
ilt−1ζ + uilt,
where i denotes ﬁrm, l denotes industry, and t denotes time. Here,
d∗
ilt is a latent variable indicating the propensity to delegate au-
thority to managers, Hilt−1 is a measure of heterogeneity, PF ilt−1
is a measure of “proximity to the frontier” (inverse measure of
“distance to the frontier”), ageilt−1 denotes the age of the ﬁrm, and
wilt−1 is a vector of other controls. All right-hand side variables
refer to t − 1, while the dependent variable is for t,w h i c hi sa n
attempt to prevent the most obvious form of reverse causality.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1773
Nevertheless, we do not view estimates from equation (3) as cor-
responding to causal effects, since there may be other omitted
factors simultaneously affecting both the (lagged) right-hand side
variables and the delegation decisions. All omitted factors are
captured by the error term uilt, which we assume to be normally
distributed.
In all of our speciﬁcations, we observe an indicator of de-
centralization, dilt ∈{ 0,1}, and in our baseline speciﬁcations, we
assume that
(4) dilt =

1i f d∗
ilt > 0
0i f d∗
ilt ≤ 0,
where d∗
ilt is given by (3). Equation (4), combined with the fact
that uit is normally distributed, leads to the standard probit model
(Wooldridge 2002). We therefore estimate (3) by maximum likeli-
hood probit. We check the robustness of our results by using logit
and linear probability speciﬁcations.
IV.B. Data and Measurement
We use two French and one UK data set. The use of multiple
data sets is an important cross-validation of the robustness of our
results. Our ﬁrst and main data set, “Changements Organisation-
nels et Informatisation” (COI), covers just over 4,000 manufactur-
ing ﬁrms.13 Using unique identiﬁers, ﬁrms in this data set are
matched to the data set FUTE, which contains the entire popu-
lation of French ﬁrms with more than 20 employees.14 Many of
our right-hand-side variables are constructed from the FUTE and
thus refer to this entire population. Since the COI contains some
ﬁrms with less than 20 employees, the match leaves us with a
total of 3,570 ﬁrms for our basic analysis.
Using the COI, we build a measure of decentralization based
on the organization of a ﬁrm’s business units into proﬁt centers
(see Appendix B for a more detailed description). In practice, once
13. For previous uses of this data set, see Greenan and Mairesse (1999), Janod
(2002), Cr´ epon, Heckel, and Riedinger (2004), Janod and Saint-Martin (2004), and
Aubert, Caroli, and Roger (2006).
14. FUTE also contains the population of nonmanufacturing ﬁrms with more
than 10 employees, which we use in some of the later tables. These data are
not published in the French national accounts, so we worked directly with the
underlying micro data located in the French statistical agencies. Similarly, the
information on the demographic structure of each ﬁrm (e.g., skills, age, gender of
employees, and hours of work) had to be built up from the employee-level data
sources aggregated to the ﬁrm level. See Appendix B for details.1774 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
a ﬁrm grows beyond a certain size, it faces the choice of retaining
centralized control or allowing some decentralization. Firms are
generally organized into business units, with different degrees
of responsibility delegated to the managers of these units. While
some ﬁrms retain complete command and control at the center,
most create some form of “responsibility centers” for business unit
managers.15 These responsibility centers (from the most to the
least decentralized) are proﬁt centers, cost centers, and revenue
centers. Our key indicator for decentralization is whether the ﬁrm
is organized primarily into proﬁt centers. When a ﬁrm organizes
into proﬁt centers, the manager keeps track of both revenues and
costs with the aim of maximizing proﬁts; he is given consider-
able autonomy in the purchase of assets, the hiring of personnel,
the management of inventories, and the determination of bonuses
and promotions.16 In contrast, a cost (revenue) center manager is
responsible only for costs (revenue). Milgrom and Roberts (1992,
pp. 229–230) contrast cost and proﬁt centers managers as follows:
“Managers who are given responsibility for proﬁts, for example,
are commonly given broader decision authority than those respon-
sible just for costs or sales.” Overall about 30% of French ﬁrms in
our sample are organized into proﬁt centers.
Our second data set, the “Enquˆ ete Reponse” (ER), is a survey
of just under 3,000 French establishments, covering all sectors
of the economy, conducted in 1998. This data set is also matched
with the FUTE to construct the right-hand side variables, which
leaves us with a data set of around 2,200 establishments. In this
data set, delegation can be measured in two ways. First, there is
a direct question asked to plant managers regarding the degree
of autonomy they enjoy from headquarters in their investment
decisions. Since this question only makes sense for ﬁrms that are
part of a larger group, the analysis is restricted to this subsample
15. For the meaning of the terms “responsibility centers” and “proﬁt
centers” in the business literature and in management, see, for exam-
ple, http://smccd.net/accounts/nurre/online/chtr12a.htm. In addition, http://www.
aloa.co.uk/members/downloads/PDF%20Output/costcentres.pdf provides a stan-
dard discussion of autonomy of proﬁt centers. Janod (2002) and Janod and Saint-
Martin (2004) have previously used these data on proﬁt centers as a measure of
decentralization.
16. Merchant’s (1989, p. 10) book on proﬁt centers explains: “The proﬁt cen-
ter managers frequently know their business better than top management does
because they can devote much more of their time to following up developments
in their specialized areas. Hence, top level managers usually do not have detailed
knowledge of the actions they want particular proﬁt center managers to take, and
even direct monitoring of the actions taken, if it were feasible, would not ensure
proﬁt center managers were acting appropriately.”TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1775
(of 1,258 establishments). Second, this data set also includes a
question on delayering—in particular, on whether there was any
reduction in the number of hierarchical layers between 1996 and
1998. Although, a priori, delayering may be associated with more
or less delegation (for example, because it may make the chief
executive more informed about lower layers), existing evidence
shows that delayering tends to involve delegating more power
to lower layers of the managerial hierarchy (see Caroli and Van
Reenen [2001] and Rajan and Wulf [2006]).
Finally, we draw on a British data set, the 1998 Workplace
Employee Relations Survey (WERS), which is similar in struc-
ture to ER. WERS does not have a question on plant managers’
autonomy with respect to investment decisions but contains a
question on their autonomy from headquarters in making em-
ployment decisions. We use this question to measure the degree of
decentralization. Unlike the French data, for conﬁdentiality rea-
sons WERS cannot be matched with productivity at the ﬁrm level,
though we can match productivity information at the four-digit-
industry level. Details on all three data sets are in Appendix B.
Our indicator of proximity to the frontier is the gap between
the log labor productivity of a ﬁrm (measured as value added
per hour) and the frontier (log) labor productivity in the primary
four-digit industry of the ﬁrm, ln yilt − ln yFlt, where F denotes the
frontier, measured in a number of alternative ways. In addition
to average labor productivity, we report robustness checks using
total factor productivity (TFP). We also construct several alterna-
tive indicators of “ frontier” productivity. Our main measure is the
highest productivity in the ﬁrm’s primary four-digit industry (de-
ﬁned as the 99th percentile, to mitigate any measurement error
from outliers that might have arisen had we used the maximum),
again calculated from the FUTE data set. We repeat the same
exercise using other percentiles (90th and 95th), and we consider
alternative measures based on the ﬁrm’s productivity rank in the
four-digit industry.
In addition to our main speciﬁcation, we also allow ln yilt−1
and ln yFlt−1 to have different coefﬁcients in the regression equa-
tion by estimating
(5) d∗
ilt = αHilt−1 + β1 ln yilt−1 + β2 ln yFlt−1
+ γageilt−1 + w 
ilt−1ζ + uilt.1776 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
This speciﬁcation allows us to test whether β2 < 0( t h a ti s ,
whether, as predicted by our theory, delegation is negatively
correlated with lagged frontier productivity) and also whether
β1 =− β2. This robustness check is particularly important, since a
positive correlation between distance to frontier and decentraliza-
tion may reﬂect a positive effect of decentralization on the ﬁrm’s
own productivity. If this were the case, in equation (5) we would
estimate that β2 = 0.
For heterogeneity, Hil, we use three measures. All three mea-
sures are constructed from the FUTE data set for the entire
covered population of ﬁrms (in the United Kingdom we use the
Annual Business Inquiry Census data). Our benchmark measure
of heterogeneity, HG
l , is the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity growth
within a four-digit sector. This measure captures the effect of the
parameter ε in the model of Section III, since high values of ε
correspond to greater heterogeneity in the performance of ﬁrms
implementing the same technology and thus to greater variability
in productivity growth within a sector. We measure productivity
growth by the ﬁrm’s average annual growth in value added per
hour over the period 1994 to 1997, and our main measure of dis-
persion is the difference in productivity growth rates between the
90th and the 10th percentiles in the four-digit industry, so that
(6) HG
l ≡ ( ln yil)90 − ( ln yil)10,
where ( ln yil)P denotes the Pth percentile of the distribution of
productivity growth across all ﬁrms in industryl. We also consider
several alternatives, such as the difference between the 95th and
the 5th percentiles, the standard deviation of ﬁrm productivity
growth rates, and the standard deviation of the trimmed produc-
tivity growth distribution.
We also present results with an alternative measure of het-
erogeneity, HL
l , constructed similarly to HG
l , but using produc-
tivity levels instead of growth rates (i.e., HL
l ≡ ln yil
90 − ln yil
10).
This measure has two empirical disadvantages relative to our
benchmark. First, it is likely to be correlated with the distance
to the frontier, so the heterogeneity and proximity terms may be
hard to identify separately. Second, the growth-based measure,
HG
l , is likely to be a better proxy for ε since it differences out
time-invariant omitted variables affecting the level of productiv-
ity that are observable to ﬁrms but not the econometrician (such
as management quality and brand differences).TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1777
These measures of heterogeneity do not vary within a four-
digit industry. Our third measure, HF
i , is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of
heterogeneityandquantiﬁes(theinverseof)howmanyotherﬁrms
are close “neighbors” of the ﬁrm in question in the product space.
When there are more similar ﬁrms (neighbors), the ﬁrm will have
greater opportunity to learn from the experiences of others, and
this will correspond to a lower value of ε in terms of our theoretical
model.17 To calculate this measure, for each ﬁrm i we compute the
distribution of production across all four-digit sectors. We deﬁne
si ≡ (si1,...,sil,...,siL)a sﬁ r mi’s shares of production in each
industry l = 1,...,L (by deﬁnition
L
l=1 sil = 1). An element of
the vector si will be equal to zero if a ﬁrm produces nothing in
industry l and will be equal to one if a ﬁrm produces all its output
in that particular industry. We then calculate the closeness of any
two ﬁrms, i and i  in the FUTE as the uncentered correlation
coefﬁcient,
cii  ≡
L
l=1 sil.si l
L
l=1 s2
il
 1
2
.
L
l=1 s2
i l
 1
2
,
which takes greater values when the production proﬁles of two
ﬁrms are more similar and is equal to one when the two proﬁles
are identical. Since our theoretical approach emphasizes the im-
portance of similarity in the context of experimenting with new
technologies, our preferred measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity
is constructed with information technology (IT) weights,
(7) HF
i ≡ log

i ,i  =i cii  · ITi 

i ,i  =i ITi 
−1
,
where ITi  is the level of investment in IT by ﬁrm i .W ea l s o
check the robustness of our results by looking at an alternative
unweighted measure. The “inverse” in equation (7) makes sure
that high levels of HF
i correspond to high values of ε in terms of
our theory.
A potential concern with this ﬁrm-level heterogeneity mea-
sure, HF
i , is that it may be related to the level of product market
17. This measure of closeness is inspired by Jaffe’s (1986) approach in the
context of patent spillovers but uses the proportion of production in a four-digit
industry. Jaffe originally used patent technology class, which has the potential
disadvantage that many ﬁrms do not patent, especially in services.1778 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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competition. If there are many other ﬁrms “close” to a company
in the product market space, then this company may be facing
tougher competition.18 To alleviate this concern, we control for
various measures of product market competition, in particular
the Lerner index (a proxy for price-cost margins), calculated as
gross proﬁts (value added minus labor costs) divided by sales,
from the FUTE data set. Moreover, we document below that
there is a robust positive relationship between product market
competition and delegation,19 so the possible negative correla-
tion between product market competition and HF
i will, if any-
thing, bias the results toward ﬁnding a negative effect of hetero-
geneity on delegation, which is the opposite of the prediction in
Section III.
In addition, since our theory emphasizes the importance of
learning in the context of the implementation of new technolo-
gies, we estimate (3) and (5) separately in high-tech and low-tech
subsamples (as measured by industry IT intensity). We expect
the patterns suggested by our model to be more pronounced for
high-tech ﬁrms.
We measure age, ageilt−1, using four dummies; age less than
5 years, between 5 and 9 years, between 10 and 19 years, and the
reference category, greater than or equal to 20 years.
Means, medians, and standard deviations for all the main
variables are presented in Table I (these are mainly based on our
core French data set, the COI). Appendix B gives greater detail on
the data used. The average ﬁrm in our data has 323 employees,
was born 22 years ago, and has three plants.
V. RESULTS
V.A. Decentralization
TableIIpresentsourbasicﬁndingsusingthedecentralization
measure from COI. Throughout, all regressions are estimated by
maximum likelihood (ML) probit and we report marginal effects
evaluated at the sample mean. All standard errors are computed
using the Huber formula, where we allow for heteroscedasticity
18. See Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2004) for a discussion.
19. For evidence of the positive inﬂuence of competition on organizational
change see Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Patterson (2001) and the McKinsey Global
Institute (2002).TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1781
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and clustering at the four-digit industry level. All regressions also
include a full set of three-digit industry dummies.20
The ﬁrst column of Table II includes only our key vari-
ables: heterogeneity (measured by the 90−10 of ﬁrm productivity
growth), frontier productivity (measured as the 99th percentile of
the productivity distribution in the ﬁrm’s primary four-digit in-
dustry), own productivity, age dummies, and the three-digit in-
dustry dummies. The results are consistent with the predictions
in Section III—all key variables take their expected signs and
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The marginal effects
of heterogeneity and own productivity are positive, whereas the
marginal effects of frontier productivity and age are negative.21
Firms inmore heterogeneous environments are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be decentralized (the marginal effect is 0.211, while the
standard error is 0.107). The youngest ﬁrms (under 5 years old)
are 15% more likely to be decentralized than the oldest ﬁrms
(those over 20 years old), and this difference is signiﬁcant at the
5% level.22 In column (2), we combine the frontier productivity
and the own productivity terms in a single “proximity to frontier”
term, as in equation (3). The marginal effect of proximity to fron-
tier is 0.167 (standard error = 0.024), while the marginal effect of
heterogeneity is 0.252 (standard error = 0.102).23
The remaining columns in Table II include a range of ad-
ditional ﬁrm-level and industry-level controls to check whether
the correlations we report are driven by omitted variables. The
20. Since the frontier productivity term and the heterogeneity measure HG
l
are deﬁned at the four-digit level, we could not identify their effects if we included
four-digit industry dummies. Nevertheless, with a full set of four-digit dummies,
we can still identify the marginal effects of age and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. In
regressions including a full set of four-digit dummies, the coefﬁcients on these
variables remain correctly signed and statistically signiﬁcant.
21. When included individually, each variable is also signiﬁcant. For example,
when we drop all other variables except the three-digit industry dummies, the
marginal effect of heterogeneity is 0.212 and continues to be signiﬁcant at the 5%
level (see Acemoglu et al. [2006] for details).
22. Note, however, that since our decentralization data are cross-sectional,
we cannot separate age effects from cohort effects. Consequently, the positive
coefﬁcient on the young ﬁrm dummy may reﬂect that companies founded in more
recent years are more likely to adopt “best practice” organizational forms than
companies founded in earlier years (see, e.g., Ichinowski, Prenushi, and Shaw
[1997]). One might also conjecture that ﬁrms in younger industries should be more
decentralized than those in older industries. We cannot investigate this question,
however, since we do not have a measure of “ industry age” (average ﬁrm age is
not a good measure of “industry age” because of the differential entry and exit
patterns across industries).
23. The Wald test rejects the restriction that β1 =− β2 at the 5% level, though
when additional covariates are included in columns (3) and (4), this restriction is
no longer rejected.1784 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
additional ﬁrm-level covariates are the Lerner index, log num-
ber of plants of the ﬁrm, log ﬁrm size (employment), fraction
of employees working with computers, fraction of highly skilled
workers, (log of) capital stock divided by value added, a foreign
ownership dummy, average age of workers, ﬁrm’s market share,
and a specialization/inverse diversiﬁcation index. The additional
industry-level covariates are the Herﬁndahl index, (log of) cap-
ital stock divided by employment, and IT expenditures divided
by employment. The ﬁxed capital stock and computer use vari-
ables are included both as potential controls and also to bring the
measure of labor productivity closer to TFP by controlling for the
contribution of various components of the capital stock. Firm-level
worker characteristics are included since these may affect orga-
nizational choices; for example, ﬁrms with more skilled workers
and/or younger workers might be more likely to decentralize con-
trol. The additional controls improve the ﬁt of the model, but the
heterogeneity, age, and productivity terms all remain individually
signiﬁcant at the 5% level or less. Also notable is that in the speci-
ﬁcation of column (3), which includes all the additional covariates,
we do not reject the hypothesis that β1 =− β2, that is, the hypoth-
esis that frontier and own labor productivity terms have equal
and opposite-signed coefﬁcients (p-value > .10).
It is also worth noting that the estimated effects of these co-
variates are consistent with the existing literature. Firms that
are more skill-intensive (Caroli and Van Reenen 2001), that em-
ploy younger workers (Aubert, Caroli, and Roger 2006), that
have more workers using computers, and/or that are more IT-
intensive industries (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002)
appear signiﬁcantly more likely to be decentralized. Further-
more, ﬁrms that are large, multiplant, foreign-owned, and/or
less specialized (more diversiﬁed) are also more likely to be
decentralized, possibly because their production processes are
more complex. Firm-level capital stock and industry-level cap-
ital stock do not appear to have a major effect on decentral-
ization. There is also a robust negative relationship between
the Lerner index, our (inverse) proxy for product market com-
petition, and the probability of decentralization, which implies
that more competitive environments are associated with greater
decentralization (similarly, high-market-share ﬁrms are signiﬁ-
cantly less likely to decentralize). We discuss the association be-
tween competition and decentralization further in the concluding
section.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1785
Since our theory in Section III relates decentralization de-
cisions to the adoption of new technologies, we expect a stronger
relationship between decentralization and heterogeneity in the
high-tech sectors than in the low-tech sectors. We deﬁne a “high-
tech” sample consisting of industries with an average ratio of IT
investment per worker greater than the sample median. The “low-
tech” sample contains the remaining industries. We reestimate
our main regression equation on these two samples separately.
Consistent with our expectations, the marginal effects and
signiﬁcance of all the key variables are greater for high-tech
sectors than for low-tech sectors. For example, the heterogeneity
index, HG
l , is positive and signiﬁcant in the high-tech sample
(column (5)), but negative and insigniﬁcant in the low-tech
sample (column (6)). The marginal effects of proximity to frontier
and of the youngest age dummy are twice as large in the high-tech
sample as in the low-tech sample. Wald tests show that these
differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level for heterogeneity and
at the 5% level for proximity to frontier (but nonsigniﬁcantly
different for age).
Overall, the results in Table II suggest that, consistent with
our theory and the relationships shown in Figures I–III, ﬁrms
that operate in more heterogeneous environments, that are closer
to the technology frontier, and that are younger are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be decentralized.
V.B. Magnitudes
To gauge the quantitative magnitudes of the estimates in
Table II, we look at the impact of doubling each variable starting
from its sample mean.
Using the estimate of the marginal effect of heterogeneity in
column (4) of Table II, 0.251, we ﬁnd that doubling the mean value
of heterogeneity (the 90−10 of ﬁrm productivity growth in the
industry) from 0.275 to 0.550 increases the predicted probability
of a ﬁrm being decentralized into proﬁt centers by approximately
7 percentage points (0.251 × 0.275 ≈ 0.069) starting from a base
of 30%, which is a sizeable effect. Thus, in “elasticity” terms, a
doubling of heterogeneity is associated with a 23% increase in the
probability of decentralization (a 6.9-percentage-point increase on
a base of 30%).24
24. A one-standard-deviation increase in heterogeneity (0.087) results in a
smaller increase in decentralization probabilities: a 2.2-percentage-point or 7.3%
increase.1786 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Again, using the estimate from column (4) of Table II, dou-
bling the proximity measure leads to a substantial increase in
the probability of decentralization by about 11 percentage points,
which represents a 37% increase on the base of about 30%
(0.164 × ln2/0.3 ≈ 0.37). Also, using the estimates from column
(4) of Table II, doubling the age of a ﬁrm from 4 years to 8 years re-
duces the probability of decentralization by a third (12 percentage
points on a 30% base). These calculations suggest that the statisti-
cal associations documented in Table II appear to be economically
as well as statistically signiﬁcant.
V.C. Alternative Measures of Technology
Table III contrasts our basic measure of heterogeneity (HG
l ,
the interdecile range of ﬁrm productivity growth rates in the in-
dustry) with several alternative indicators of heterogeneity. The
ﬁrstcolumnofTableIIIreplicatesthespeciﬁcationfromthefourth
columnofTableIIforcomparison. Thenextthreecolumns,(2)–(4),
use alternative measures of heterogeneity, still based on the dis-
persion of productivity growth rates across ﬁrms within the four-
digit industry. Column (2) shows a result qualitatively similar to
that in column (1), using the difference between the productivity
growth rates at the 95th and 5th percentiles (instead of the 90th
and 10th percentiles). The marginal effect is 0.142 with a stan-
dard error of 0.069. In column (3) we use the standard deviation of
the growth rate, which also has a positive marginal effect, but is
only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This lack of precision may be due
to a number of outliers in the ﬁrm-level productivity growth dis-
tribution. In column (4), we use the standard deviation calculated
after trimming the top and bottom 5% of the ﬁrm-level productiv-
ity growth distribution and obtain a much larger and much more
signiﬁcant marginal effect.
Column (5) includes the heterogeneity term based on ﬁrm
productivity levels, HL
l . The marginal effect of this variable is
positive but is not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated mag-
nitude is comparable to that in column (1); however, a dou-
bling of HL
l is associated with a 27% increase in decentralization
(an 8.1 percentage point increase on a base of 30%) compared to
23% for our benchmark measure, HG
l . Furthermore, as with our
benchmark results in Table II, the level-based measure of het-
erogeneity, HL
l , has a large and statistically signiﬁcant marginal
effect of 0.271 in the high-tech sample (column (6)). In contrast,TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1787
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its marginal effect is nonsigniﬁcant (and negative) in the low-tech
sample (column (7)) and is also signiﬁcantly different from the
estimate in the high-tech sample (p-value = .009).
Columns (8)–(11) report results using the ﬁrm-level measure
of heterogeneity, HF
i .25 Recall that this index measure is the (in-
verse) IT-weighted distance of a ﬁrm to all other ﬁrms. This is an
entirely different source of variation in heterogeneity and thus
constitutes a useful cross-validation of the main results. In col-
umn (8) of Table III, HF
i has a marginal effect of 0.063 and a
standard error of 0.031. The next two columns show that, as with
the other measures, the effect of heterogeneity is stronger in the
high-tech sample than in the low-tech sample (0.098 with a stan-
dard error of 0.048 versus 0.019 with a standard error of 0.037).
Finally, in column (11) we look at the simpler unweighted mea-
sure of the ﬁrm-level heterogeneity measure. This is useful as
another check to see whether the measure HF
i is capturing some
competition-related factors. If that were the case, we would expect
the unweighted measure to be stronger. The unweighted measure
also has a positive effect, but with a smaller coefﬁcient that is
only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests that,
consistent with our theoretical approach, the IT weights increase
the explanatory power of the ﬁrm-level heterogeneity index.26
Overall, the results in this table show that there is a robust
positive association between heterogeneity and decentralization,
particularly in high-tech industries.27
V.D. Further Robustness Checks
In addition, we conducted a large number of robustness
checks (see Acemoglu et al. [2006] and Appendix B for details).
These checks show that our main results do not depend on the
25. All of the results in Table II are similar if we use this measure. For
example, the most parsimonious speciﬁcation in column (1) of Table II gives a
marginal effect of HF
i of 0.111 with a standard error of 0.034.
26. If we include both the weighted and the unweighted measures together
with all the covariates, the weighted measure is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level (marginal effect = 0.184, standard error = 0.096), while the unweighted
measure is negative and insigniﬁcant (marginal effect =− 0.142, standard error
= 0.109).
27. One concern with any measure of heterogeneity is that, since it is corre-
lated with uncertainty in ﬁrm’s environment, it may affect the extent of the moral
hazard problem between the ﬁrm and the manager (an issue we have abstracted
from in the model). Nevertheless, everything else equal, this effect would bias
the results against ﬁnding a positive association between heterogeneity and de-
centralization, since greater uncertainty should increase “agency costs,” making
decentralization less attractive.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1789
precise functional form, the control variables, or the exact sam-
ple. Here we give a brief summary of these robustness checks.
First, estimating by OLS or logit gave marginal effects very
similar to the probit estimates of column (3) in Table II.
Second, alternative measures of productivity and distance to
the frontier also gave similar results. For example, results us-
ing total factor productivity were very close to those using labor
productivity. We also experimented with alternative deﬁnitions of
the distance to the frontier using an ordinal measure (the rank of
the ﬁrm’s labor productivity in the four-digit industry) or the pro-
ductivity distribution relative to lower percentiles than the 99th
percentile in order to measure the frontier (e.g., the 95th and
the 90th). Again, the results were qualitatively similar, but the
marginal effects of the frontier became progressively weaker as
we used the 95th and the 90th percentiles. This pattern is not sur-
prising, since we expect the 95th and 90th percentiles to be poorer
proxies for the technology frontier than the 99th percentile.
Third, although a single ﬁrm can be organized into divisions,
with each division being decentralized as a proﬁt center, the mea-
sureofproﬁtcentersmaybemorenaturalforﬁrmsthatarepartof
larger groups. To investigate this issue and also to exclude poten-
tiallyowner-managedﬁrms,whichmaybedifferentforavarietyof
reasons, we reestimated our basic speciﬁcation on the subsample
of 1,793 ﬁrms that are part of a larger corporate group. Reassur-
ingly, the effects of heterogeneity and proximity to the frontier are
considerably larger and more signiﬁcant in this subsample (0.461
with a standard error of 0.140 for heterogeneity and −0.303 with
a standard error of 0.056 for the frontier).
Another concern is that we have allocated a single “frontier”
productivity to each ﬁrm, whereas ﬁrms that operate across mul-
tiple industries will have multiple “frontiers.” To address this con-
cern, we limited the sample to ﬁrms that have at least 80% of
their sales in their primary four-digit industry, since the multiple
industry issue should not be a serious concern for these ﬁrms.
In this limited sample of 2,555 ﬁrms, both heterogeneity and the
frontier terms remain highly signiﬁcant, but themarginal effect of
the frontier term is somewhat smaller; −0.179 instead of −0.225
in the baseline speciﬁcation.
We also estimated instrumental-variable models to address
the issue of endogeneity of our main right-hand side variables.
Our strategy was to use the UK counterparts of our key variables
as instruments. Although this approach does not solve all possible1790 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
endogeneity problems, it is a useful check against reverse causal-
ity concerns. We constructed heterogeneity variables identical to
HG
l based on the dispersion of productivity growth among British
ﬁrms for the same time period to instrument French industry-
level heterogeneity. We also constructed the 99th percentile of
the productivity distribution in each four-digit British indus-
try as a potential instrument for the French proximity to fron-
tier. The details are provided in Acemoglu et al. (2006). Brieﬂy,
these instruments are highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stages. Us-
ing instrumental-variables probit (see Lee [1981]), we estimated
positive and signiﬁcant effects of both heterogeneity and proxim-
ity to the frontier in the second stage. The marginal effects in
this case were 1.572 for heterogeneity and 0.456 for proximity to
the frontier (compared to 0.230 and 0.167 when these variables
are treated as exogenous). These instrumental-variable results
therefore suggest that, if anything, treating heterogeneity and
proximity as exogenous may be causing some attenuation due to
measurement error and making us underestimate the impact of
heterogeneity and proximity to the frontier on decentralization.
V.E. Alternative Measures of Decentralization
Two alternative measures of decentralization are control over
investment decisions and delayering. Whether an establishment’s
senior managers can make investment decisions without consult-
ing headquarters is directly related to delegation of authority.
In addition, case studies and econometric evidence suggest that
reducing the layers of the managerial hierarchy tends to be asso-
ciated with decentralized decision-making. 28 There are questions
on delayering and the autonomy of investment decision-making
in our second French data set, the Enquˆ ete Reponse (ER).29
Delayering is deﬁned as the removal of one or more layers of the
managerial hierarchy between 1996 and 1998. Our indicator of
investment autonomy/decentralization is equal to one if the plant
managerhas“full”or“important”authorityinmakinginvestment
decisions independently of central headquarters and to zero if he
28. See, for example, Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Rajan and Wulf
(2006).
29. In the COI data set there is an indicator of the number of hierarchical
levels, but as discussed in Appendix B, a better data source to measure delayering
istheER.ThisisbecausetheERquestionondelayeringrefersexplicitlytochanges
in management as in our theory, while the COI question refers to the number
of “hierarchical levels” and is thus likely to be more informative on hierarchies
involving nonmanagerial workers.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1791
has “limited” or “no” autonomy in making such decisions. In this
case, we also limit the sample to ﬁrms that are part of a larger
group, because the question on delegation of investment decisions
from headquarters is only relevant for these ﬁrms.
Table IV shows the results of estimating equation (5) for these
alternative measures both for the full sample and also separately
for the high-tech and the low-tech samples (constructed using in-
dustry IT intensity as in Table II). In columns (1)–(3) the depen-
dent variable is an indicator of whether the ﬁrm grants autonomy
over investment decisions to its plant managers. In columns (4)–
(9), the dependent variable is an indicator for whether there was
a reduction in the number of layers in the managerial hierarchy
between 1996 and 1998.
In column (1) of Table IV, frontier productivity is negatively
and signiﬁcantly related to the probability of allowing managers
to make investment decisions without consulting headquarters
(decentralization). Heterogeneity is positively related to decen-
tralization but (like the ﬁrm’s own productivity) is insigniﬁcant.
When we distinguish between high-tech (column (2)) and low-
tech samples (column (3)), however, the results are stronger. The
marginal effect of heterogeneity for high-tech sectors is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, whereas in the low-tech sample,
heterogeneity is nonsigniﬁcant. Similarly, the marginal effect of
the productivity frontier is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to
decentralization in the high-tech sample, but is positive and non-
signiﬁcant in the low-tech sample. Own productivity and age are
nonsigniﬁcant in both samples.
The next six columns use the measure of delayering as the
dependent variable. In column (4) the productivity terms are both
correctly signed and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the closer a ﬁrm
is to the technology frontier, the more likely it is to choose delay-
ering. Younger ﬁrms are also signiﬁcantly more likely to delayer
than older ﬁrms.30 The heterogeneity term is positive and signif-
icant at the 10% level. When we split the sample into high-tech
(column(5))andlow-tech(column(6))sectors,themarginaleffects
of heterogeneity and frontier productivity are again much larger
for high-tech sectors than for low-tech sectors, but the standard
errors are also much larger in both samples. In contrast, the age
30. Although the ER data are at the establishment level, the regressions in
Table IV use ﬁrm age to make the results comparable to those in Tables II and
III. The young ﬁrm dummy remains positive and signiﬁcant if we also condition
on establishment age.1792 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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effects are larger in the low-tech sample, which is the opposite of
the prediction of our theory.
Since the delayering variable measures organizational
change (rather than the level of decentralization, as in our previ-
ousdependent variable), wealsoconsidered regressions where the
productivity terms are in differences rather than in levels. Since
we do not have reliable time-series information on the heterogene-
ity term and some of the other covariates, they are still included
in levels. The results, presented in columns (7)–(9), are similar
to the benchmark estimates but somewhat weaker. The frontier
growth term is correctly signed but no longer signiﬁcant, and the
own productivity term is also nonsigniﬁcant. 31 The heterogeneity
measure remains positive and signiﬁcant in the full sample. With
the sample split, however, heterogeneity is no longer signiﬁcant
in either sample (presumably because of the smaller number of
observations), though, as expected, the marginal effect is substan-
tially larger in the high-tech sample.
In summary, the results from using delayering and autonomy
over investment decisions as alternative indicators of decentral-
ization broadly support our earlier conclusions. Decentralization
appears to be more likely when the environment is more hetero-
geneous and when ﬁrms are closer to the technology frontier, par-
ticularly in the high-tech sample, though the age results appear
to be somewhat less robust.
V.F. Decentralization in Britain
We complement our evidence from the French micro data sets
with an analysis of the British Workplace Employee Relations
Survey (WERS98). The French Enquˆ ete Reponse was modeled on
the WERS, and we use the 1998 wave to match the year used in
the ER. The WERS cross section does not have a question on au-
tonomy over investment decisions, but there is a similar question
on the establishment manager’s autonomy over employment de-
cisions. Senior managers were asked whether they were able to
31. The weakness of the frontier growth term in this case is related to the
highercorrelationbetweenproductivitygrowthandheterogeneityvariables(recall
that heterogeneity is deﬁned here as the inter-decile range of productivity growth
rates in the ﬁrm’s four-digit industry). In column (7), if we drop the heterogeneity
and ﬁrm productivity terms, the marginal effect of frontier productivity growth
increases to −0.061 and becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% level. If we use the full
speciﬁcation of column (7), but just include two-digit (instead of the usual three-
digit) industry dummies, the marginal effect of frontier growth becomes −0.074,
with a standard error of 0.038.1794 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
make decisions on staff recruiting without consulting company
headquarters. Our WERS sample is further restricted because we
are only able to match manufacturing establishments to industry-
level information (since census information on nonmanufacturing
is not available over this time period). Finally, we are unable to
condition on the rich set of ﬁrm-level covariates as in the French
data, because conﬁdentiality restrictions limit the data that can
be matched at the ﬁrm-level (such as ﬁrm-level output, capital or
age).
The results are presented in Table V.32 Column (1) includes
theﬁrstmeasureofheterogeneity(thedifferencebetweenthe95th
percentile and the 5th percentile of the productivity growth rates
in the four-digit industry) with only a full set of three-digit in-
dustry dummies as extra controls. Heterogeneity is positively and
signiﬁcantly associated with decentralization at the 5% level. The
next column performs the same exercise for the 90 − 10, the rela-
tionship is still positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Column
(3) includes the frontier growth term, which is negatively signed,
as we would expect from the theory, but nonsigniﬁcant. The fourth
column includes the age dummies. These are nonsigniﬁcant and
show no clear pattern (possibly because in this data set we only
have establishment age rather than ﬁrm age).
The ﬁfth and sixth columns include all the covariates. There
appears to be some evidence that ﬁrms facing less competition
are signiﬁcantly less likely to decentralize. More importantly, the
heterogeneity terms measured either as the 95 − 5 (column (5))
or the 90 − 10 (column (6)) percentile differences remain positive
and signiﬁcant. The frontier term is negative and signiﬁcant at
the 5% level in both columns. These ﬁndings are consistent with
our theory and with the results from the French data sets, even
though they use a different data set from a different country.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite considerable academic and popular interest in
changes in the internal organization of the ﬁrm, we are far from a
theoretical or empirical consensus on the determinants of the or-
ganizational decisions of ﬁrms and on the reasons that there has
recently been a signiﬁcant move toward greater decentralization.
32. Because the sample size is smaller with WERS, we estimate liner proba-
bility models instead of probit. The results with probit are broadly similar.TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1795
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In this paper we presented a simple model of the relationship
between technology, information, and decentralization and em-
pirically investigated the main predictions of this model using
three microlevel data sets. In our model, ﬁrms delegate authority
to managers, that is, “decentralize,” in order to use the manager’s
superior information about the implementation of new technolo-
gies. Because the interests of the manager and the principal are
not perfectly aligned, such delegation entails a costly loss of con-
trol for the principal. The model predicts that as the amount of
publicly available information about the optimal implementation
of new technologies increases, ﬁrms should become less likely to
decentralize, whereas ﬁrms dealing with new (frontier) technolo-
gies should be more likely to decentralize. We also showed that
ﬁrms in more heterogeneous environments and young ﬁrms are
more likely to choose decentralization. These are intuitive, but
quite novel, predictions and have, to the best of our knowledge,
never been investigated empirically.
We documented that in all three data sets the correlations
are broadly consistent with the predictions of our model. Firms in
more heterogeneous environments and those that are closer to the
frontier of their industry are more likely to choose decentraliza-
tion. Moreover, consistent with the predictions of the theory, these
results are stronger for ﬁrms in high-tech sectors. The results are
robust to using a variety of alternative measures of decentraliza-
tion and heterogeneity. We also found that younger ﬁrms tended
to be more likely to decentralize, though this result was less ro-
bust when we looked at alternative measures of decentralization.
These results suggest that the recent move toward more decen-
tralized organizations may be driven, in part, by the rapid diffu-
sion of new technologies and the increase in the number of young
ﬁrms.
Thetheoryandempiricalresults,takentogether,suggestthat
learning and information accumulation may have important ef-
fects on the internal organization of ﬁrms and may be especially
important for decentralization decisions. Our analysis also high-
lights a number of avenues for future research. First, it would be
useful to study decentralization and vertical integration decisions
jointly,sincethesameforcespushingtowarddecentralizationmay
also encourage spinoffs and reduce the incentives for vertical in-
tegration.
Second, our empirical results showed a robust positive associ-
ation of competition and decentralization. An interesting questionTECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 1797
is to investigate the channels through which competition may
affect decentralization. One possibility is that competition may
increase the value of information because falling behind com-
petitors may be costly to ﬁrms, thus encouraging delegation to
the manager, who has superior information. Yet another effect
of a more competitive environment may be through disciplining
the manager; faced with greater competition, managers may be
forced to take proﬁt-maximizing decisions more often, thus reduc-
ing the conﬂict of interest between the principal and the man-
ager. This would naturally increase delegation, since delegation
becomes more attractive to the principal.
Another interesting area for future research would be to in-
vestigate whether the statistical associations between proximity
to frontier or heterogeneity and decentralization correspond to
the causal effects of these variables on the internal organization
of the ﬁrm, for example, by estimating a more structural model.
Finally, our approach suggests that cross-country differences
in the internal organization of ﬁrms constitute a promising area
for future research, since there may be less decentralization in de-
veloping countries, where most ﬁrms use well-established (rather
than frontier) technologies.
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